Distributed patient scheduling in hospitals by Paulussen, T.O. et al.
Distributed Patient Scheduling in Hospitals
T. O. Paulussen∗
Inf. Sys. Dept.
Univ. of Mannheim
Mannheim, Germany
paulussen@uni-mannheim.de
N. R. Jennings
Elect. & Comp. Sci. Dept.
Univ. of Southampton
Southampton, UK
nrj@ecs.soton.ac.uk
K. S. Decker
Comp. & Inf. Sci. Dept.
Univ. of Delaware
Newark, Delaware, USA
decker@cis.udel.edu
A. Heinzl∗
Inf. Sys. Dept.
University of Mannheim
Mannheim, Germany
heinzl@uni-mannheim.de
Abstract
Patient scheduling in hospitals is a highly complex
task. Hospitals have a distributed organisational
structure; being divided into several autonomous
wards and ancillary units. Moreover, the treat-
ment process is dynamic (information about the
patients’ diseases often varies during treatments,
causing changes in the treatment process). Current
approaches are insufﬁcient because they either fo-
cus only on the single ancillary units, and therefore
do not consider the entire treatment process of the
patients, or they do not account for the distribution
and dynamics of the patient scheduling problem.
Therefore, we propose an agent based approach in
which the patients and hospital resources are mod-
elled as autonomous agents with their own goals,
reﬂecting the decentralised structures in hospitals.
In this multi-agent system, the patient agents com-
pete over the scarce hospital resources. Moreover
to improve the overall solution, the agents then ne-
gotiate with one another. To this end, a market
mechanism is described, in which each self inter-
ested agent tries to improve its own situation. In
particular we focus on how the agents can calculate
demand and supply prices based upon their current
schedule. Further, an evaluation of ﬁrst results of
the proposed method is given.
1 Introduction
Patient scheduling in hospitals is concerned with the optimal
assignment of patients to hospital resources. Hospitals are
divided into several autonomous wards and ancillary units,
which are visited by the patients for treatments and exami-
nations during hospitalisation in accordance with their illness
[Schl¨ uchtermann,1990]. However, the pathways (the needed
treatments and examinations) and the medical priorities (the
health condition of the patients) are likely to change due to
new ﬁndings about the diseases of the patients during exami-
nation. Further, complications and arrivals of emergency pa-
tients, which are in urgent need for treatment, result in sched-
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ule disturbances1 [Schl¨ uchtermann, 1990]. Due to this, pa-
tient scheduling in hospitals requires an approach which is
distributed, in order to leave the authority at the responsible
hospital units, and ﬂexible, to be able to react to plan changes
in an efﬁcient manner.
We have chosen to adopt a multi-agent based approach to
this problem, because such systems allow the representation
of every single coordination object, i.e. the responsible enti-
ties, as single autonomousagents with their own goals [Wein-
hardt and Gomber, 1996]. This, in turn, reﬂects the existing
decentralised structures in hospitals [Decker and Li, 2000].
Through social abilities, the agents can interact with each
other to reach their own goals. Moreover they can react with
the needed ﬂexibility to changes (as new information about
the health status of a patient becomes available) and distur-
bances (e.g. emergencies and complications) through proac-
tiveness and responsiveness [Jennings, 2001].
This paper advances the state of the art in two main ways.
First is the design of a novel procedure, i.e. a patient cen-
tred multi-agent based coordination mechanism, where the
patients are represented as autonomous agents, trying to im-
prove their current scheduling state by negotiation with other
agents. Second is the derivation of health state dependentop-
portunity cost functions, based upon which the agents eval-
uate their current schedule and compute the gains and losses
through plan modiﬁcations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion2describesthedomainofpatient-schedulinginhospitals.
Section3detailstheconceptualframeworkofourmulti-agent
system,therelevantcoordinationobjectsandthecoordination
mechanism. The results of the proposed mechanism are also
evaluated. The paper ends with conclusions and an outlook
to further work in section 4.
2 The Patient Scheduling Problem
In addition to the complexity arising from the distributed
structure of hospitals, patient scheduling has to be performed
in the face of a high degree of uncertaintyabout the treatment
pathways of patients within the hospital. Thus patients arrive
1This problem can be ameliorated by the provision of addi-
tional (exclusive) emergency resources (e.g. separate x-ray facili-
ties). However, for economic reasons, hospitals try to minimise
these extra resources.continuously at the hospital and the necessary medical treat-
ments are often not able to be completely determined at the
beginning of the treatment process. Moreover the results of
a diagnostic examination might change the (medical) priority
of the patients, invoke additional activities and/or make other
medical actions obsolete.
Due to this complexity, the application of traditional (op-
erations research) methods from industrial scheduling to the
patient scheduling problem is problematic [Schl¨ uchtermann,
1990]. To be able to handle the process dynamics in a dis-
tributed environment, hospitals commonly use a very ﬂexible
approach for patient scheduling. Typically, the wards send
treatment and examination requests to the ancillary units.
Based upon these requests, the ancillary units order the pa-
tients from the wards. This allows the units to react very ﬂex-
ibly to changes with very low communication needs. If, for
example, an emergency patient needs to be inserted, the next
patient will simply be called from the ward later, leaving this
patient available to other ancillary units.
However, because there is no inter-unit coordination, this
procedure cannot resolve resource conﬂicts, which occur if
the same patient is requested by more than one ancillary unit
at the same time [Decker and Li, 2000]. Because the ancil-
lary units only have a local view, i.e. they do not – and cannot
– take the whole pathway of the treated patients into their
scheduling consideration, no inter-unit process optimisation
can be undertaken (i.e. the medical tasks for the patients can-
not be scheduled and coordinated in an efﬁcient manner).
This causes undesired idle times as well as overtime hours
for the hospital resources and extended patient stay times.
3 Agent-Based Patient Scheduling
In this section the conceptual framework of our multi-agent
system is described. Then, the relevant coordination ob-
jects, i.e. the patients and hospital resources, are modelled as
agents. After this, a coordination mechanism is introduced.
Finally, examples are given and the ﬁrst results of the imple-
mentation are presented.
3.1 Conceptual Framework
Using a multi-agent system, [Decker and Li, 2000] addressed
the problem of resource conﬂicts in the patient scheduling
domain. Speciﬁcally, by adding a coordination mechanism
to handle mutually exclusive resources (i.e. the patients) to
the Generalized Partial Global Planning (GPGP) approach2,
theyachievedsigniﬁcantschedulingimprovementscompared
to current patient scheduling without coordination. In their
work, they took a function-orientedapproach, where only the
units are represented as autonomous agents. The treatment
pathwayofthepatientsis capturedbythenursingunits. How-
ever, the dynamics of the patient scheduling problem and the
medical priorities of the patients were not considered.
For this reason, we use a patient-centred approach, in
which the patients are modelled as agents, too. This allows
the representation – and therefore consideration – of the hos-
pital processes as a whole [Adam and Gorschl¨ uter, 1999].I n
2GPGP is a domain independent, task environment centred,
scheduling approach to coordination[Decker and Li, 2000].
contrast to the resource agents, who only see the patients as
entities to be treated, the patient agents only see the medi-
cal actions as tasks that need to be performed. Due to these
opposing forces, the patient agents ensure that the resource
agents also consider the treatments of the patients outside
their unit (without any explicit knowledge of them) and vice
versa.
To this end, the relevant coordination objects in the hospi-
tal (i.e. the entities to be coordinated), which will be repre-
sented as agents, can be identiﬁed as patients and resources
(i.e. rooms, machines and personnel). To reduce complexity,
all resources needed for a speciﬁc medical action are repre-
sented by the hospital unit responsible for this action, which
will be implemented as the resource agents.
If more than one patient agent now wants to use the iden-
tical resource at the same time interval, a resource conﬂict
occurs. To solve these conﬂicts, a coordination mechanism
is needed. For this inter-agent coordination, we decided to
use a market mechanism. The rationale for this is that a
market mechanism is a distributed coordination mechanism
which facilitates efﬁcient solutions with low communication
needs. In particular, only prices for speciﬁc goods are com-
municated, keeping all other information private to the mar-
ket participants [Wellman et al., 2001]. Additionally, a mar-
ket facilitates a dynamic environment, where the market par-
ticipants take actions according to their current (dynamically
changing) situation based upon private information and pref-
erences. In this market, the coordinationobjects are modelled
as autonomous, self-interested market participants, trying to
improve their local schedule. In markets, the price mecha-
nism leads to an efﬁcient resource allocation because the re-
sources are assigned to the agents that are willing to pay the
highest price (assuming that the agents bid rationally, these
are the agentswhogainthe highestutility fromthis resource).
A pareto optimal solution will be achieved, because no agent
will accept a deal, which worsens its current state. Therefore,
the agents will trade resources until no agent can improve its
schedule without harming another agent [Weigelt, 1994].
3.2 Coordination Objects
To implement a coordination mechanism, the above men-
tioned coordination objects have to be modelled. In this
work the main goal for the patients is to minimise their stay
time and for the resources to minimise idle times. This kind
of scheduling problems represents a worth-oriented environ-
ment [Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994], where the degree
of goal achievement can be evaluated by a utility function
(rather than a state or task oriented environment,where a sin-
gle goal cannot be achieved partially). The usage of contin-
uous worth functions instead of single worth values assigned
to speciﬁc goals enables the agents to relax their goals, i.e.
to compromise in order to achieve a better solution [Rosen-
schein and Zlotkin, 1994]. For example, if two agents want
the same time slots at the same resource, the agents can agree
upon a solution which does not fully satisfy their own goals,
but reaches a better overall solution. This situation is illus-
trated in the ﬁgures 2(a) and 2(b).
Because we adopt a patient-centred approach, the main fo-
cus will be on the patient agents, which will be modelled inthe ﬁrst subsection. Within this part, we introduce the health
state dependentcost-functions,which are needed for price ar-
ticulationinthe marketmechanism. In thesecondsubsection,
the resource agents are described.
Patient Agents
Each patient is represented by an agent. The patient agents
can only see their own schedule, containing their pathway
through the hospital. The pathway of a patient agent com-
prises the needed treatments and examinations as well as the
order constraints between those tasks. The patient agents are
also equipped with a private worth function to be able to ne-
gotiate in a goal driven manner. This worth function is re-
alised as a cost function, which they try to minimise. These
cost functions increase over time, setting incentives for the
patient agents to schedule their treatments and examinations
as early as possible in order to reduce costs.
In contrast to commercial domains, the utility or cost func-
tions cannot be based upon monetary values in hospitals.
While in e-commerce scenarios the human principals reveal
their preferences through their willingness to pay (e.g. by
specifying maximum buy and minimum sell prices), patients
do not – and should not – reveal their preferences through
their willingness to pay for a speciﬁc treatment time slot. The
preferences rather have to be based upon medical priorities,
i.e. their health state. This absence of normalised monetary
units additionally causes the problem of inter-agent utility
comparison. To solve this problem, we operationalised the
progress of the patients’ health state. In current hospital prac-
tice, numerous health states or patient priority measures and
indices are in use (e.g. APACHE II (Acute Physiology And
Chronic Health Evaluation) [Knaus et al., 1985] in intensive
care units). The choice of the measurement to use is up to
the hospital. However, we propose, that it should support a
cardinal measurement of the health state progress over time.
The cardinalmeasurement is necessaryforinter-agentutil-
ity comparison and transfer (as we have to calculate with
these units). Because these health state (utility) units cannot
be transferred between the actual patients in the hospital, the
multi-agentsystem has to beseparatedfromthe actual patient
world, where only the agents transfer utility units in order to
reach a better overall solution (minimisation of health state
adjusted patient stay time).
The health state progress is important, because the priority
of the patients should not be based upon their current state,
but on their health state development. For example, a patient
with a currently reasonable but rapidly deteriorating health
condition should have a higher priority than a patient with
a (slightly) lower current, but continuously constant, health
state.
For the necessary cardinal measurement of health, we rely
on the concept of years of well being [Torrance, 1987] be-
cause it handles the health state progress over time (a good
overview can be found in [Pedroni and Zweifel, 1990]). In
this method, the question is what time period xT of total
health (1) equals one speciﬁc time period 1T of a certain
health state H, i.e.
1T ∗ H = xT ∗ 1 ⇔ H = x.
Through this, the health state of a patient can be described in
time units.
The primarygoal ofpatients in hospitals is to increase their
current health state through treatment, where a disease could
be viewed as disutility (decrease in quality of life) for the pa-
tient. This loss of utility adds up as long as this disease is
not cured. Based on this assumption, the (opportunity) cost
Copp for not curing the patient right away equals the differ-
ence between the achievable health state (through treatment)
z and the patient’s health state over the time H(t). Formally,
this can be expressed by
Copp(t)=
 t
0
z − H(t)dt.
In addition, it has to be considered that the health state and
the achievable health state can change over time. Therefore,
the patient’s opportunity costs are inﬂuenced by his current
health state a, the development of his health state over time
H(t), and the maximal reachable health state through treat-
ment z. If the health state does not change over time, i.e.
H(t)=a, the opportunity costs are
Copp(t)=µt;µ = z − a.
If the health state of a patient worsens over time, assump-
tions about the course of the health state have to be made by
a physician. If we assume – for clarity – a linear reduction by
b of the health state, i.e. H(t)=a − bt, we get
C
opp(t)=zt− at +
b
2
t
2 = µt +
b
2
t
2.
However, this approach works with any health decrease
rate,as thehealthstateofapatientnormallydoesnotdecrease
linearly. Nevertheless, a linear approximationof the decrease
in health can be justiﬁed by practical reasons. Instead of try-
ing to estimate the exact shape of the curve, a physiciancould
rather specify two or more speciﬁc points in time and in be-
tween a linear reduction could be estimated. Figure 1 shows
an exemplary course of an illness with linear reduction of the
health state, resulting in a quadratic opportunity cost curve.
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Figure 1: Linear reduction of health state.
Finally,if themaximalreachablehealthstate decreases, the
patient must be treated immediately to prevent lifelong dam-
age to his health.With these cost functionsin place, the agentscan noweval-
uate their current state, i.e. the degree of goal achievement.
Further, based on these functions, the agents are able to com-
pute supply and demand prices for time slots which corre-
spond to the losses or beneﬁts caused by plan changes, which
is essential for a market mechanism. How these prices are
computedwill be explainedlater in the contextof the descrip-
tion of the coordination mechanism (section 3.3).
Resource Agents
In contrast to the patients, the hospital resources are directly
comparable with the resources in industrial scheduling do-
mains. Their main goal can be described as maximising their
utilisation or, equivalently, minimising idle time.
To reach this goal, cost-functions can also be articulated
for the resource agents. These cost functions represent the
reserve prices (i.e. the price that will be charged for an empty
slot) for the possible appointments [Wellman et al., 2001].
Through this, priorities between different resources can be
established that allow penalisation of undesired appointment
times (e.g. evening shift or overtime hours). Here, the basis
for the resource agents’ cost functions comes from cost ac-
counting.
However, for inter-agent utility comparison (i.e. between
patient and resource agents) these measurements have to be
equalised, which can be a very difﬁcult task, because the
health state of a patient has to be compared with monetary
values from cost accounting. A good way out of this problem
are trade-off considerations, e.g. what amount of idle time of
a speciﬁc resource equals one hour waiting time for a patient
with a speciﬁc health state.
3.3 The Coordination Mechanism
The main goal of the coordination mechanism is to minimise
the health state adjusted stay time of the patients, which is
equivalent to an overall minimisation of suffering for the pa-
tients. The basic idea of our coordination mechanism is that
the patient agents try to buy into resource time slots for the
needed treatments and examinations. However, the usage of
(central) auction mechanisms is obstructed by the dynamics
of the patient scheduling problem described in section 2.
To ensure feasible (i.e. conﬂict free) initial task appoint-
ments for the patients, all new treatments and examinations
are scheduled on a ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-served (fcfs) basis. To do
this, the patient agents who want to add a task to their path-
way contact the responsible unit for the execution of this task
in order to obtain the earliest time slot which is available at
the unit as well as in their own schedule. To illustrate this,
ﬁgure 2(a) shows a possible initial resource allocation. These
initial appointmentsdetermine the budget (orbetter the initial
opportunity costs) of the agents. This is important because a
hypothetical price system is used (as per section 3.2).
Based upon this initial schedule, the agents try to improve
their schedule in order to reduce their opportunity costs. The
price p they are willing to pay for a speciﬁc time slot (ex-
pected gain) or they charge for a time slot (expected loss) is
the difference between the cost-value of the current alloca-
tion told and the cost-value for the wanted appointment tnew,
according to their individual cost function described in the
previous section, i.e.
p(t
old,t
new)=C
opp(t
old) − C
opp(t
new).
Because in this approach the (opportunity) costs of an ap-
pointmentincrease overtime for the patient agents, they must
try to schedule their treatments and examinations as early as
possible. If a demanded time slot is already occupied by an-
other patient agent, the initial demander must try to buy the
time slot from the current owner. With respect to the proper-
ties of a market mechanism, the agents act in a rational, self-
interested manner. Therefore, the owners of the time slots
will only release them, if the price offered equals the losses
invoked through rescheduling. Since they only charge for the
costs invokedthroughreschedulingtheycanbeviewedas act-
ing in a partially cooperative manner.
The detailed negotiation process goes as follows:
1. A patient agent initiates a negotiation for rescheduling,
if the pathway (additional or obsolete medical actions)
or the health state of its patient has changed.
2. The initiating agent selects the task with the highest pos-
sible improvement (difference between the costs of the
current owned and the best reachable time slot) and con-
tacts the resource agent that is responsible for the execu-
tion of this task.
3. The resource agent reserves that time slot, and contacts
all affected patient agents, i.e. the agents that currently
own this interval, and informs them about the proposal
of the initiator.
4. The affected patient agents (sellers) try to reschedule to
the ﬁrst nonreserved time slots (see step 3) and notify
the initiator about their costs due to rescheduling. To
prevent cycles, reserved intervals cannot be demanded
by other agents.
5. If the alternative time slots for the sellers are already
occupied, they again become demanders for those time
slots and accumulatethe invokedcosts. Here, ordercon-
straints can invoke additional rescheduling in other re-
sources.
6. After all prices are computed and submitted to the ini-
tiator, the initiator compares its expected gains from
rescheduling to the total price asked for this interval. If
the gains exceed the costs it accepts or rejects otherwise,
and the negotiation for this time slot terminates.
The formerinitiatorcontinuesits reschedulingactivities by
opening new negotiations for the next task with the (now)
highestpossibleimprovementuntilitcannotimproveanytask
any further. Previously rejected time slots will not be consid-
ered unless these time slots are released by their owners. For
concurrencyissues onlyone(randomlychosen)agentcan ini-
tiate a negotiation at a time.
In this coordination mechanism only the patient agents are
active components. However, as described earlier, cost func-
tions can be implemented into the resource agents, allowing
prioritisation between the resources. The resource price for a
time slot is chargedwhen a patient agent buys a time slot, and
reimbursed when the patient agent releases this time slot.As described earlier, the pathway of the patients through
the hospital is likely to change during the treatment process,
that is, additional treatments and/or examinations may be-
come necessary while other tasks may become obsolete. In
our coordination mechanism, additional tasks (as well as ad-
ditional patients) can be added at any time using the fcfs rule
explainedabove. Ifa treatmentbecomesobsolete,therespon-
sible patient agent notiﬁes the affected resource agent that,
again, informs the other patient agents in its schedule.
3.4 Example Scenarios
Figure 2(a) and 2(b) illustrate the functioning of our coordi-
nation mechanism. Figure 2(a)shows an initial schedulewith
threepatients(A,B,C).Forillustrationpurposes,we startwith
identical cost-functions with an assumed initial health state a
of 0.7, an achievable health state z of 1.0, a decrease rate b of
0.001 and equal possible starting times for all patients. The
used cost function resolves as 0.3t +0 .0005t2. Further, in
this example, all task durations are set to 10t. We will use the
$-sign to indicate utility units.
A C
C A B
B Unit 1
Unit 2
time
(a) Schedule before negotiation.
A C
C A B
B Unit 1
Unit 2
time
(b) Schedule after negotiation.
Figure 2: Example Schedule before and after negotiation.
Based upon this initial schedule, agent C negotiates with
agent B in unit 2 in order to improve its current situa-
tion. Agent C’s current opportunity costs in unit 2 are $12.8
(0.3 × 40 + 0.0005 × 402). Its opportunity costs for the ﬁrst
time slot would be $3.05 (i.e. a difference of $9.75). For the
calculation of the offer price, agent B has to determine its
additional rescheduling costs. Therefore agent B has to ne-
gotiate with agent A in unit 2 for the next best time slot and
in unit 1, because the patients are exclusive resources which
can only perform one task at a time. Agent A looses $3.25
in unit 2 and another $3.15 in unit 1. Agent B looses $3.15
in unit 2 but gains $3.15 in unit 1. Agent B is charged with
the losses of Agent A ($6.40)and adds this to its supply price
for agent C (here $3.15 − $3.15 = $0.00). Because the total
supply price ($6.40)is less than agent C’s gains ($9.75)agent
C accepts the deal (because it can compensate the losses of
the other agents) and the plan is changed. No more deals are
possible and ﬁgure 2(b) shows the result of this negotiation.
In this example, patient agent A accepted a schedule of
lower quality in favour of patient agent C. However, only pa-
tient agent A – not the real patient – has received a compen-
sation frompatient agent C. This illustrates the necessarydis-
junction between the real patients and the multi-agent system
in the hospital domain as described earlier (section 3.2).
In the next step, we relax the assumption, that all agents
have the same cost functions. If agent C would have had a
lowerhealthstate (e.g.µ =0 .35)itcouldhaveevenimproved
its appointment in unit 1 because it would have gained $3.75
from moving to the second slot (agent A in ﬁgure 2(b)) while
agent A would only ask $3.25 for its slot (agent A moves to
slot 1 and gains $3.15, and agent B movesto slot 3 and looses
$6.40).
We have applied the described coordination mechanism to
the ﬁrst Taillard 5 × 5 open shop problem [Taillard, 1993]
to analyse the behaviour for tasks with different durations.
Figure 3 shows the resulting Gantt chart with a solution of
349. The optimal solution is 300. To analyse the convergence
ofthe mechanism,we loggedthechangesofthelatest task for
each agent. Figure 4 shows the corresponding convergence
behaviour, which indicate a fast convergence in the ﬁrst third
of the graph.
Figure 3: Gantt of the results of the Taillard 5x5 open shop
problem.
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Figure 4: Converge of the Taillard 5x5 open shop problem.
The number of negotiation rounds counts each improve-
ment attempt (successful or not) of the agents. The same pro-
cedure was executed for the n × n open shop problems with
equal task durations. For these problemsthe optimal solution
will be always achieved. The resulting Gantt chart is shown
in ﬁgure 5. Figure 6 shows the corresponding convergence,
illustrating the simplicity of this problem type in contrast to
the used Taillard benchmark.
However, a better agent-based solution to this problem can
be achieved through the usage of (central) appointment auc-
tions. Implementing an auction based approach using the
same cost functions resulted in a solution at 308. How-
ever,these auctions cannothandlethe dynamics of the patient
scheduling problem, because the auction process would haveFigure 5: Gantt of the results of the easy 5x5 open shop prob-
lem.
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Figure 6: Converge of the easy 5x5 open shop problem.
to restart again after severe changes in the pathway occurred.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we presented a patient-centred coordination
mechanism for inter-unit patient scheduling in hospitals.
Therefore, health state dependent cost functions were devel-
oped. We described the implemented coordination mecha-
nism and evaluated ﬁrst results, showing the different conver-
gence for problems with equal and different task durations.
In the next step, we will run our approach on real hospi-
tal data, already retrievedout of a ﬁeld study in ﬁve hospitals.
Basedupontheseresults,ourcoordinationmechanismwill be
enhanced in future work, where the main focus is on the de-
velopment of a ﬂexible auction mechanism in order to handle
the dynamics of the patient scheduling problem. In this con-
text, we will analyse how the usage of texture measurements
(here:criticalityandgoodnessmeasures) [Sycaraet al.,1990]
can facilitate our coordination mechanism in order to reduce
backtracking. Additionally, our agent based approach will
be benchmarked with a genetic and evolutionary algorithm,
which is under development in the context of this work. Fur-
ther, a decision theoretic approach facilitating stochastic task
duration will be presented in the near future.
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